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WRESTLING WITH THE
ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION
DOCTRINE: HOW PUSKAR V. KRCO
FURTHER COMPLICATED THE
HEAVILY LITIGATED HISTORY OF THE
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN
AMERICA
DAN KNUDSEN*
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a long-held constitutional
principle that prohibits a court from resolving a dispute that is inherently
religious in nature. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine’s practical application requires a court to either abstain from fact-finding issues that are
based on religious doctrine or church governance, or defer to the decisions
handed down by the church leadership or a hierarchical authority. An implicit concept within the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is the necessity
for there to be an interchurch dispute—namely, one that is confined to a
local church body or a hierarchically structured religious organization.
Since not every dispute within a church is fundamentally religious, courts
are not precluded from resolving certain church disputes using neutral
principles of law. A neutral property or contract issue may not necessarily
impermissibly intrude on the First Amendment.
This Note examines the Illinois Second District Appellate Court’s
confrontation with the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in the insightful
case of Puskar v. Krco. The majority and dissenting opinions in Puskar
represent the difficulty of adjudicating disagreements when it is unclear
whether a religious question is inescapably intertwined or merely peripheral. Puskar would have been legally insignificant if the outcome turned solely on whether an appointed Serbian Orthodox Church bishop owed a duty
of loyalty to the higher appointing authority or the local diocese. However,
before duty of loyalty could be decided, the local diocese, a former affiliate
of the Serbian Church, contested that it had officially reunited with the hierarchical Serbian Orthodox Church to become re-affiliated. Reunification
was contested because the local diocese and the Serbian Orthodox Church
disagreed whether a contract they had enacted to guide their transition to
reunify remained in effect. Nearly lost in the conflict was the bishop whom
the local diocese had allowed the Serbian Orthodox Church to appoint over
them, even though he was a focal point of the lawsuit. The bishop had been
139
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appointed in accordance with a provision contained in the transitional contract, and the local diocese did not dispute the legitimacy of the appointment, even though the appointment occurred at a time it would later conclude must have fallen after the transitional contract had expired.
The majority in Puskar held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply because the transitional contract had expired, and thus
the former affiliate and the Serbian Orthodox Church were separate and
distinct organizations. The dissent in Puskar would have applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine due to the inherently religious questions the
court faced. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s matter of fact holding
that the transitional contract had expired, and instead focused on what appeared to be sufficient evidence that the former affiliate and the Serbian
Orthodox Church had either reunified or remained under the transitional
contract. This Note analyzes Puskar in comparison to other Illinois appellate court cases, and concludes that Puskar’s dissenting position was more
correct to reach its determination.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine plays a vital role in maintaining
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
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Amendment.1 The First Amendment’s mutual restraint on church and state
has significant relevance when courts are presented with legal issues entangled amongst religious disputes.2 When a dispute within a church or hierarchical religious association is either religiously intertwined or subject to a
decision by a church authority, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits a civil court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.3 In modern jurisprudence, courts have the authority to, when appropriate, apply neutral
principles of law to resolve a dispute so long as the court’s decision does
not involve ecclesiastical or polity issues.4 Some downplay entanglement
issues and advocate that courts have the authority and capability to litigate
even disputes that appear religious.5 Some would advocate doing away with
the neutral principles of law approach.6 The majority adhere to a balanced
approach where courts defer to church authority and ecclesiastical issues,

*
Juris Doctor candidate, May 2016, and Lead Articles Editor for the Northern
Illinois University Law Review. I would like to thank the Hon. Robert Spence for bringing
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to my attention. This Note could not exist otherwise. I
must thank my mom for her continued graciousness to listen each time I updated her on my
research. Lastly, I am exceedingly grateful to the Northern Illinois University Law Review
for providing me the opportunity to write this Note, and for its exceptional staff that made
publication possible.
1
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
2008); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U.L. REV. 493, 501-03 (2013).
2. See 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 21.12 (5th ed. 2012) (“When there is a dispute between
factions of a religious organization, one or more of the parties may seek resolution of the
dispute by a state court. Of course, the government cannot declare which party is correct in
matters of religion, for that would violate the principles of both religion clauses.”).
3. E.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Administering the Ministerial Exception Post-HosannaTabor: Why Contract Claims Should Not Be Barred, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 383, 405 (2014) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is the general body of case
law standing for the principle that civil courts cannot rule on matters that are ‘strictly and
purely ecclesiastical.’” (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871))).
4. E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“compulsory deference” is not
required when there are “no issue[s] of doctrinal controversy . . . involved”).
5. See Helfand, supra note 1, at 551-62 (construes the early Court decisions as
outlining a deferential approach to religious tribunals’ decisions, but a civil court would not
be precluded from carefully litigating matters which may generally be considered religious
disputes); Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious
Organizations, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 516 (1990) (when it comes to property disputes, the
“[a]rticle advocates that courts, in their resolution of internal religious disputes, must apply a
truly neutral set of legal principles.”).
6. See John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the
Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 353-54 (1997) (church property disputes would not
exist but for a religious dispute).
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while still allowing neutral principles to resolve property disputes disassociated from religious issues.7
The Illinois Second District Appellate Court had an extraordinary opportunity to positively impact a fifty-year-old conflict surrounding the Serbian Orthodox Church, but unfortunately Puskar v. Krco8 shed a dejected
outlook on the possibility of discrete resolution within the church. In 1991
the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate of New Gracanica Diocese of the
United States and Canada (“Metropolitanate Diocese”) began the process of
reunifying with the Serbian Orthodox Church (Serbian Church).9 The
churches had previously been unified under a hierarchical structure until
1963, but following the monumental Supreme Court decision Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich,10 they became disassociated for the subsequent thirty years.11 Beginning around 2008, tensions arose concerning whether a reunification had
taken place, whether the transitional documents continued to govern the
reunification, and the loyalties of the bishop the Serbian Church had appointed over the Metropolitanate Diocese.12 The trial court dismissed the
case citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.13 The majority in Puskar reversed and instead applied
neutral principles of law to hold that the transitional documents had expired
and therefore the churches remained separate and autonomous.14 The dissent believed there were ecclesiastical issues intermingled and that the court
should have been prohibited from resolving the issue of the transitional
documents.15
7. See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 12-19 (2011) (“[T]he Court has not doubted that church autonomy is a right of constitutional dimension.” But, “[l]ike other property rights, rights to church property must be
resolved by the state.” “Church autonomy is thus a principle of deference, not abstention.”);
David J. Young & Steven W. Tiggs, Into the Religious Thicket Constitutional Limits on Civil
Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 475, 497-99 (1986) (acknowledging there are “two different approaches for resolving similar issues—deference for
ecclesiastical disputes, and neutral principles for church property disputes” where the court
assesses the type of conflict to determine whether it would be required to defer).
8. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, petition for leave to appeal denied, Puskar v. Krco, 20 N.E.3d 1262 (Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
9. See id. ¶¶ 2, 6. Both the Puskar majority and dissent consistently refer to the
“Metropolitanante [sic] Diocese” rather than the “Metropolitanate Diocese.” The apparent
misspelling of Metropolitanate appears to have originated at the trial court. This Note will
use the spelling “Metropolitanate Diocese” throughout.
10. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
11. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 3-7.
12. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 24.
13. See id. ¶ 32.
14. See id. ¶¶ 42, 45-48 (majority opinion).
15. See id. ¶ 51 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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Puskar illustrates how courts must wrestle with whether a case involves the religious intricacies the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine specifically prohibits.16 However, given the history and the dearth of available
case law, misapplication of either the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine or
neutral principles should be avoidable.17 Each Illinois Appellate District has
interacted with both the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the application of neutral principles.18 Based on the unique circumstances of Puskar
and the applicability to existing Illinois case law, this Note advocates that
the dissenting opinion was more correct in its analysis.
The background section of this Note explains the constitutional development of both the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the neutral principles of law approaches. Puskar is then examined to explain the details of
the case and how the majority and dissent each held. Lastly, Puskar is analyzed in comparison to relevant Illinois appellate decisions that have confronted the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, in order to interact with the
issues of an interchurch dispute and whether neutral principles or the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine would be appropriate.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the significance of Puskar, the history of the
constitutional principles of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the
neutral application of law to religious disputes must be examined. This section first reviews early United States Supreme Court case law. Then, it discusses how the origination of the dispute in Puskar intersects with Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Lastly, this section discusses the United States Supreme Court and Illinois acceptance of neutral principles of law when applied in a limited manner to religious disputes.
A. EARLY CASE LAW
In the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones,19 the United States Supreme
Court first established the deferential approach to the ecclesiastical deci16. E.g., Susan v. Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of Am., 2012 IL App (1st)
120697-U, ¶ 7 (“[T]he abstention doctrine itself has been equally hard for courts to apply
consistently in practice.”).
17. E.g., id. (“[A]s we mentioned in Bruss, the core of the doctrine simply requires
us to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute involves resolving ‘matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.’” (quoting
Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008))).
18. E.g., Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God Church, 657 N.E.2d 688,
692 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995). See also infra text accompanying notes 207-49.
19. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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sions of a church.20 Watson involved a dispute between two factions of
members of a Presbyterian church.21 The congregation was split over the
issue of institutional slavery, and each faction claimed ownership of the
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church.22 The Court outlined three classifications of church property ownership, with the Watson dispute involving
property that was for the use of a local church congregation when the local
church was itself identified as being part of a hierarchical structure.23 Watson expressed that a court must accept the decisions of the highest church
authorities, because “civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” when the “subject-matter of [the] dispute [is] strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character.”24 A dispute would be considered ecclesiastical when it “concerns [a]
theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required
of them.”25
Given that the Bill of Rights was not incorporated when Watson was
decided,26 the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional aspects of ecclesiastical disputes for the first time in 1952 in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America.27 Kedroff addressed
a property dispute between the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and
the North American branch of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the
ownership and control of St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York. 28 The Court
framed the use or control of the property as dependent upon the selection of
clergy and the hierarchical structure of the churches following the Russian
Revolution.29 Citing Watson, the Court identified that the Constitution protected the “freedom for religious organizations” to decide the selection of
clergy and church governance, apart from “state interference” and “secular
control or manipulation.”30 The Court not only deferred to the decisions of
the hierarchical authority, but the Court also invalidated a New York law

20. Helfand, supra note 1, at 521, 535.
21. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681.
22. Id. at 681, 690-92.
23. See id. at 722-26.
24. Id. at 727, 733.
25. Id. at 733.
26. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 617 n. 4 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Watson v. Jones was decided at a time when the First Amendment was not considered to be
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
27. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694, 704 (2012).
28. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N.
Am., 344 U.S. 94, 95-96 (1952).
29. See id. at 96-97, 100-05.
30. Id. at 115-16.
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which had attempted to regulate church property disputes by allowing the
state to interfere in “area[s] of religious freedom.”31
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Watson again in 1969 in Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.32
Presbyterian Church was similar to Watson and Kedroff in that it also involved a property ownership dispute between local congregations and the
hierarchical church.33 Not surprisingly, the Court refused to intervene in an
ecclesiastical question when the hierarchical tribunal had already decided
the matter.34
B. THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH'S CONTRIBUTION TO
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine of court abstention peaked in
1976 in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America
& Canada v. Milivojevich.35 The nearly two decades of litigation examined
in Milivojevich36 was a precursor to the dispute in Puskar.37 The litigation
centered around the control of church property after the hierarchical Serbian
Orthodox Church had removed and defrocked Bishop Dionisije Milivojevich, and reorganized the American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian
Orthodox Church into three separate dioceses.38 The trial court had found
that the disputed property was not controlled by the Serbian Orthodox
Church because it was “held in trust for all members of the AmericanCanadian Diocese,” and that the reorganization by the Serbian Orthodox
Church was improper.39 The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the reorganization since it had not been approved by the American-Canadian Diocese, but the court also set aside the removal and defrockment of Bishop
Dionisije because it was “not conducted according to . . . the Church’s constitution and penal code.”40 The Milivojevich Court reversed the Illinois
Supreme Court because it instead recognized that control of the American31. See id. at 114-15, 119-21 (“[W]hen the property right follows as an incident
from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.”).
32. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1969).
33. See id. at 441-42.
34. Id. at 445-46.
35. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
36. See id. at 697-708.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 75-107.
38. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 697-708.
39. Id. at 707-08.
40. Id. at 708.
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Canadian Diocese’s property depended upon resolving the removal and
defrockment of Bishop Dionisije, and thus as a religious dispute already
determined by an ecclesiastical tribunal, it was prohibited by the First
Amendment.41 Regarding the reorganization of the American-Canadian
Diocese, the Court held that the Illinois Supreme Court had erroneously
“substituted its interpretation of [each church] constitution[] for that of the
highest ecclesiastical.”42 Under Milivojevich, “hierarchical religious organizations [may] create tribunals for adjudicating disputes,” and “the Constitution requires that civil courts accept [ecclesiastical tribunal’s] decisions as
binding upon them.”43 In so concluding, Milivojevich is known to have continued the trend of court deference towards religious tribunals over matters
involving religious disputes, 44 even when tangentially involving property.45
Following the remand and a later appeal back to the Illinois Supreme Court,
the span of litigation finally came to a halt, although it would unfortunately
not last.46 As a result of Milivojevich, the ownership of the disputed properties was transferred to the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the AmericanCanadian Diocese formed its own church.47
C. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW APPROACH
The neutral principles of law approach was first espoused by the Supreme Court in 1969 in Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.48 Presbyterian Church posited the
notion that neutral principles of law could be applied to settle church property disputes, even though the Court ultimately held that the First Amendment prohibited the Georgia courts’ application of the “departure-fromdoctrine.”49 Milivojevich is even said to have approved the possibility of a
41. Id. at 709, 713, 725 (“[A] civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of
church tribunals as it finds them.”).
42. Id. at 721 (“[R]eorganization of the Diocese involve[d] a matter of internal
church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs,” and the Serbian Orthodox
church “constitution commit[ed] such questions of church polity to the final providence of
the Holy Assembly.”).
43. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724-25 (1976).
44. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV.1633, 1644 (2004) (Milivojevich reiterated that
the free exercise of religion prohibits courts from deciding religious questions).
45. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709.
46. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 387 N.E.2d
285, 289 (Ill. 1979). The period of ceased litigation ended when Puskar began.
47. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 3.
48. See Gerstenblith, supra note 5, at 519.
49. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (discussing the departure-from-doctrine as “re-
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civil court’s neutral enforcement.50 Jones v. Wolf,51 however, was the first
decision in which the Supreme Court “explicitly applied ‘neutral principles.’”52 Jones rejected “a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.”53
In 1979, the Court in Jones encountered a property dispute concerning
the ownership of the Vineville Presbyterian Church.54 The Vineville church
was a part of the hierarchical Presbyterian Church in the United States
(“PCUS”), while the actual church property had been purchased by local
church members and held in trust for the local church and its successors.55
A schism formed between members of the Vineville church over whether it
would separate from the PCUS.56 The Jones Court adopted neutral principles of law as a constitutionally viable approach allowing courts to rely on
“objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law” to resolve
church property disputes.57 At the same time, the Court cautioned that a
“court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body” if “interpretation of the instruments of ownership
would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy.”58 The
Jones Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court, which had
assertedly used neutral principles in adjudicating the matter, even though it
had concluded so “without discussion or analysis that the title to the property was in the local church and that the local church was represented by the
quir[ing] the civil judiciary to determine whether actions of the general church constitute
such a ‘substantial departure’ from the tenets of faith and practice . . . . If the court should
decide that a substantial departure has occurred, it must then go on to determine whether the
issue on which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the traditional theology.”).
50. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (citing Milivojevich, at 723 n.15).
The section of Milivojevich the Jones Court references states: “The constitutional provisions
of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce
them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723. Footnote 15 from Milivojevich implied the ability of a
civil court to look into the “formal title” of the property, or whether the property was held in
trust. Id. at 723 n.15.
51. Jones, 443 U.S. 595.
52. Young & Tiggs, supra note 7, at 496.
53. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605.
54. Id. at 597.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 598.
57. Id. at 603-04. The Court cited Georgia's use of neutral principles as an example
of how a civil court could “examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution . . . tak[ing] special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms.” Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
58. Id.
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majority rather than the minority.”59 The Georgia Supreme Court would
thus have to determine if it had properly applied neutral principles because,
in the Court’s opinion, resolving the dispute had the potential to improperly
invade into religious doctrine or usurp a hierarchical decision.60 Since
Jones, the neutral principles approach to church property disputes allows a
court to “examine the deeds to the property and any other relevant documents, including the church constitution or bylaws, to determine where title
to the property is vested and whether it is held in trust.”61
Although the neutral principles approach has not changed in substance
since Jones, in 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court once again addressed a church
autonomy case, leading some to speculate as to the Court’s restatement of
deference for religious institutions.62 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission63 was a
unanimous decision which applied the ministerial exception doctrine64 to
prohibit a teacher’s wrongful termination claim against her former employer, a church operating a religious school.65 The Court looked back to Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich for the underlying support that the First
Amendment protects the ecclesiastical decisions of religious institutions,
specifically the hiring and firing of ministers.66 Hosanna-Tabor limited its
application of the ministerial exception to employment discrimination suits;
the Court did not delve into “actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”67
D. ILLINOIS'S ADOPTION OF THE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
APPROACH
Lowe v. First Presbyterian Church68 formally established the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Illinois.69 In doing so, the Illinois Supreme
59. Id. at 606-07, 609.
60. Id. at 608-09.
61. See Young & Tiggs, supra note 7, at 497.
62. See Helfand, supra note 5, at 496 n.12; Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 2012 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 307, 322-23, perma.cc/NJ22-W36Z.
63. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012).
64. The ministerial exception doctrine “precludes application of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.” Id. at 705.
65. Id. at 699-700, 707, 710.
66. Id. at 704-06.
67. Id. at 710.
68. Lowe v. First Presbyterian Church, 308 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 1974).
69. See Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God Church, 657 N.E.2d 688,
691 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
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Court relied on Watson, Kedroff, and Presbyterian Church to ultimately
abstain from resolving a property dispute between some members at a local
Presbyterian Church and the hierarchical body of the Presbyterian Church,
when the ecclesiastical body had already rendered a decision.70 Lowe is a
pre-Jones case and the Illinois Supreme Court has never directly confronted
the constitutionality of the neutral principles application to church disputes.
However, each Illinois Appellate District has since adopted and applied the
neutral principles of law approach.71 Even though Illinois accepts neutral
principles and Jones’s rejection of “compulsory deference,”72 Illinois courts
still refrain from intervening in ecclesiastical disputes,73 which Jones also
subscribed to.74
III. EXPOSITION OF PUSKAR V. KRCO
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Plaintiffs in Puskar v. Krco are members who “hold various positions
of authority” within “the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate of New
Gracanica Diocese of the United States and Canada” (“Metropolitanate
Diocese”).75 The sole defendant is Bishop Longin Krco, the elected Bishop
of the Metropolitanate Diocese.76 The discord present in Puskar v. Krco is a

70. See Lowe, 308 N.E.2d at 802, 804-05, 807.
71. See generally Clay, 657 N.E.2d at 692-94 (acknowledged neutral principles
approach but did not apply to specific issue); St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios,
572 N.E.2d 283, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (“Where doctrinal controversy is not involved in a church dispute, however, mandatory deference to religious authority is not required . . . and the court may choose from a variety of approaches in resolving the dispute.
One such approach [is] the ‘neutral principles of law’ approach.” (citation omitted)); Williams v. Palmer, 532 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988) (“We acknowledge that
the neutral principles approach has been judicially accepted in Illinois.”); Aglikin v. Kovacheff, 516 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987) (“If doctrinal controversy is not
involved, the first amendment does not require that the States adopt a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority in resolving property disputes. . . . State courts may choose .
. . the neutral principles approach.”); York v. First Presbyterian Church of Anna, 474 N.E.2d
716, 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1984) (“We find that the Lowe decision does not prevent our
disposition of this appeal by a neutral principles analysis. We note preliminarily that the
significant Jones case was decided several years after Lowe.”).
72. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979).
73. See, e.g., Clay, 657 N.E.2d at 693 (“Even the ‘neutral principles of law approach’ is not to be applied when a civil court would need to decide an ecclesiastical issue.”).
74. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604.
75. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 2.
76. Id.
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descendent of Milivojevich.77 In 1963, the Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Church declared its autonomy from the hierarchical authority of the Serbian
Orthodox Church (“Serbian Church”), which brought about the Supreme
Court case Milivojevich.78 The prolonged litigation allowed the Serbian
Church to retain all of the disputed property, and eventuated in the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church founding the “Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese of
the United States and America.”79 The Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese’s
Affidavit of Organization, recorded in 1977, and its Constitution, adopted
in 1986, declared itself completely autonomous from the Serbian Church.80
In 1991, the Free Serbian Orthodox Diocese changed its name to the Metropolitanate Diocese.81 The schism between the Metropolitanate Diocese
and the Serbian Church was in large part due to the communist control of
the former Yugoslavia, thus, after the decline of communism, the relationship between the two churches became amiable in 1992, and they began
discussing reunification.82 The Metropolitanate Diocese and the Serbian
Church together enacted a document called the “Transitional Regulations”
(“Regulations”) to guide their reunification efforts.83 The Regulations became a central figure in conflict.
There were several articles of the Regulations central to the dispute.
Article Two84 stated that the Regulations were to remain in force “until the
adoption of a common Constitution ‘for a period not to exceed three
years.’”85 In seemingly contradictory fashion, Article Sixteen indicated only
that the Regulations would remain in effect “until the adoption of a common constitution.”86 Article Two also provided that Metropolitanate Diocese would “be governed based on the ‘Holy Scripture and Holy Tradition’
of the [Serbian] Church; . . . the [Regulations] ‘in the spirit of the Constitution’ of the [Serbian] Church; and the provisions of the Metropolitanate
Diocese's Constitution that did not conflict with the [Regulations].”87 Articles Five and Six authorized the Serbian Church to appoint or elect a bishop
77. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 698-708 (1976); Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 3.
78. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 3; see also supra notes 35-46 discussing Milivojevich.
79. Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 3.
80. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
81. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6.
82. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.
83. Id. ¶ 6.
84. In paragraph twenty-six the opinion refers to the trial court noting Article one
contained the three-year expiration provision, but the majority and dissent each cite to Article two as containing the three-year expiration provision in every other instance.
85. Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 7, 26.
86. Id. ¶ 58.
87. Id. ¶ 7.
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or administrator in the event of a vacancy within the Metropolitanate Diocese.88 Article Fourteen provided that: “[t]he protection of Church property
shall be regulated according to the hierarchical structure of [the [Serbian]
Church] as provided for by the respective Constitutions, Rules and Regulation of the [Metropolitanate Diocese], and the laws of the respective countries.”89
In 1998, six years after the enactment of the Regulations, the Serbian
Church appointed Bishop Longin to an administrative position within the
Metropolitanate Diocese.90 The following year Bishop Longin was elected
to serve as “Diocesan Bishop of the Metropolitanate Diocese.”91 A representative body of the Metropolitanate Diocese convened in 1998, 1999,
2002, and 2005 in order to discuss the enactment of a common constitution,
but each time allegedly failed to approve a proposed constitution.92 However, in 2008 the Serbian Church “circulated a document” purporting to be a
common constitution approved by the Metropolitanate Diocese in 1998,
which Plaintiffs denied ever approving.93 Furthermore, in 2009 the Serbian
Church announced the Metropolitanate Diocese would be reorganized as a
part of the Serbian Church, and Bishop Longin “publically stated that a
reorganization of the Metropolitanate Diocese had occurred and that there
was no longer a division between the Metropolitanate Diocese and the
[Serbian] Church.”94
Plaintiffs maintained that a common constitution was never approved
by the representative body of the Metropolitanate Diocese, and that the
Regulations expired after three years of the 1992 enactment.95 Plaintiffs
brought an action against Bishop Longin in 2011 seeking a “declaratory
judgment that the Metropolitanate Diocese was an independent and autonomous religious organization,” and to permanently enjoin Bishop Longin
from “‘taking any action causing the transfer of property’ belonging to the
Metropolitanate Diocese,” since Bishop Longin, in his position as bishop,
had control over much of the Metropolitanate Diocese’s property and assets.96
Bishop Longin held fast to his assertions that not only had the Regulations not expired three years after enactment, but that the Metropolitanate
Diocese and the Serbian Church were no longer “separate entities,” and
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9 (some brackets in the original).
Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 8.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 13, 24.
Id. ¶¶ 14-16.
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therefore the decisions of the Metropolitanate Diocese’s representative
body were controlling, not the Metropolitanate Diocese People’s Assembly.97 Instead, Bishop Longin argued that the Metropolitanate Diocese had
submitted to being “canonically and hierarchically” a part of the Serbian
Church, in accordance with the bilaterally agreed-upon Regulations.98 To
support his argument that the Regulations were still in effect beyond three
years, Bishop Longin cited examples of how Plaintiffs had demonstrated
through their statements and actions that they remained under the Regulations.99 The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine would therefore prohibit the
trial court from resolving an internal church dispute according to Bishop
Longin.100 Bishop Longin stated that attempting to resolve the question of
the Metropolitanate Diocese’s autonomy necessarily required delving into
the polity of the Serbian Church and determining the Serbian Church’s authority to “adopt a new constitution and reorganize its diocese.”101
Plaintiffs rebutted Bishop Longin’s application of the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine arguing that the two churches had not merged, and thus
the Metropolitanate Diocese remained separate and autonomous and was
not bound by the decisions of the Serbian Church.102 Furthermore, Plaintiffs
held the notion that the trial court could use the neutral principles of law
approach to interpret the Regulations to “determine whether the Metropolitanate Diocese was separate and/or subordinate to the [Serbian] Church.”103
Plaintiffs also believed that it was “beside the point” whether the Regulations remained in effect, since Bishop Longin had not proved the Regulations meant the two churches had merged.104
The trial court found that Plaintiffs’ complaint was a dispute over the
control of Metropolitanate Diocese property accompanied by a disagreement “whether the [Regulations] document remained in effect and whether
97. Id. ¶ 17.
98. Id. ¶ 20. Bishop Longin further argued that the Metropolitanate Diocese had
agreed to become part of the hierarchical Serbian Church because the Regulations “were to
remain in effect until the adoption of a common Constitution,” he was authorized to sign the
amended Affidavit of Organization on behalf of the Metropolitanate Diocese in 1998, the
2008 constitution the Serbian Church stated the Metropolitanate Diocese had adopted, and
the Serbian Church had restructured the Metropolitanate Diocese in 2009. Id. ¶ 20.
99. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 28. Bishop Longin gave four
examples: in 1998 an amended Affidavit of Organizations was filed; in 1999 the Metropolitanate Diocese newspaper stated the Regulations were still in effect; in 1998 and 1999 Plaintiffs allowed the Serbian Church to appoint Bishop Longin to his positions; and in 2009 he
“fully understood and fully concurred” that the Serbian Church was authorized to reorganize
the Metropolitanate Diocese. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 21.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
103. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 22-23.
104. Id. ¶ 29.
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a common constitution had been adopted by the Metropolitanate Diocese.”105 But the trial court also noted how Plaintiffs’ action was solely
against Bishop Longin rather than the Serbian Church, and the “complaint
was ‘primarily a dispute over church polity and only tangentially a dispute
over the control of church property.’”106 The trial court granted Bishop
Longin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.107
B. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion in Puskar agreed with the trial court’s understanding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded a court from
deciding disputes over church polity, while the neutral principles approach
dismissed the “mandatory deference to religious authority” when a dispute
did not involve a “doctrinal controversy.”108 The majority, however, disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the subject matter of the disagreement, and instead characterized it as involving contract interpretation
only, rather than church polity.109 The court held the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine should not have been a hindrance to the trial court’s judgment.110 The trial court had relied upon Bruss v. Przybylo in reaching its
finding, but the majority held Bruss was distinguishable from the facts before it.111 Bruss applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because the
subject matter concerned “the qualifications and fitness of a priest,” of
which the court was precluded from deciding,112 while the majority intoned
qualifications and fitness of a priest were not presently disputed.113
Instead, the majority framed the issue as strictly a contract dispute between two separate churches who freely entered an agreement, stating, “the
trial court did not determine whether the [Regulations] document was still
in effect; whether a common constitution between the Metropolitanate Diocese and the [Serbian] Church had been adopted; or whether the Metropolitanate Diocese was subordinate to the [Serbian] Church.”114 The majority,
moreover, struck down Bishop Longin’s argument that Plaintiffs’ attached
exhibits containing his “unilateral actions” invalidated Plaintiffs’ complaint,
105. Id. ¶¶ 30-32.
106. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
2008)).
107. Id.
108. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 37 (majority opinion).
109. Id. ¶ 38 (majority opinion).
110. Id. ¶¶ 38, 42 (majority opinion).
111. Id. ¶¶ 39-40 (majority opinion).
112. See id. ¶ 39 (majority opinion) (citing Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102,
1122-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008).
113. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 40 (majority opinion).
114. Id. ¶¶ 40-41 (majority opinion).
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stating Bishop Longin’s actions only “served to further confuse the relationship between the parties.”115
Before it reversed the trial court, the majority addressed whether “the
[Regulations] document expired without the adoption of a joint constitution.”116 Answering in the affirmative, the majority held that the Regulations had expired in 1995 since its “terms . . . when read as a whole, are
clear.”117
C. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent in Puskar disagreed with the majority construing the issue
“as one of contract interpretation,” and instead believed that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented the court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction.118 To the dissent, the “heart of plaintiffs’ claims” was whether
Bishop Longin had violated his duty to the Metropolitanate Diocese by
proclaiming that the two churches were united, and whether the Metropolitanate Diocese had become subordinate to the Serbian Church.119 But before either of those could be resolved, the dissent stated there were preventative ecclesiastical issues of “(1) whether a common constitution had been
adopted; (2) the duration and significance of the [Regulations] and the documents it incorporates; . . . and (3) [Bishop Longin’s] authority to file an
Affidavit of Organization declaring that the Metropolitanate Diocese was
bound by the [Regulations] and was subordinate to the [Serbian]
Church.”120
In fact, the dissent chided the majority for “oversimplify[ing] the nature of the dispute by labeling it as one of contract interpretation, i.e., interpretation of the [Regulations].”121 The majority had asserted that the trial
court should have resolved the dispute by “constru[ing] the viability of the
contracts,” and further insisted that the Regulations had expired after three
years.122 But the dissent stated the viability of the Regulations could not be
115. Id. ¶ 42 (majority opinion) (Bishop Longin authorized the adoption of a common constitution on behalf of Metropolitanate Diocese in 2008).
116. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44, 48 (majority opinion).
117. Id. ¶ 47 (majority opinion) (“The [Regulations] document states clearly that,
unless a common constitution is reached by the governing bodies of each church, the terms
of the agreement will expire after 3 years' time.”). The majority stated that Bishop Longin's
unilateral actions subsequent to the Regulations expiration did not matter since the document
was no longer in effect, but omitted the circumstances of Bishop Longin’s appointment as
administrator and bishop. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 47.
118. Id. ¶ 51 (Spence, J., dissenting).
119. Id. ¶ 53 (Spence, J., dissenting).
120. Id. ¶ 54 (Spence, J., dissenting).
121. See id. ¶ 55 (Spence, J., dissenting).
122. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 55 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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determined without “improperly delving into issues of church doctrine and
polity,” because it was not clear whether the Regulations had expired, or
whether the Metropolitanate Diocese was still governed by the Regulations.123
The Regulations contained conflicting provisions, “and the parties
continued to operate as though it remained in effect.”124 The dissent pointed
to the evidence that lent credence to the fact “that the parties continue to
operate as though the document was still in place.”125 The first was the Metropolitanate Diocese’s official newspaper which had stated in 1999 that the
Regulations continued to govern the Metropolitanate Diocese.126 The second was the Serbian Church’s authority under Articles Five and Six of the
Regulations to appoint Bishop Longin as Administrator Bishop and later
Diocesan Bishop of the Metropolitanate Diocese, which occurred in 1998
and 1999, respectively, “long after the Regulations had allegedly expired.”127 The dissent went on to state that, “if the Regulations remain[ed]
in effect, the Metropolitanate Diocese [was] not autonomous, as the majority assert[ed], but subordinate to the [Serbian] Church.”128 In arriving at that
conclusion, the dissent looked at the language of Article Two, which not
only provided that religious documents of the Serbian Church would govern
the Metropolitanate Diocese, but also that the Regulations would supersede
conflicting provisions of the Metropolitanate Diocese making the Metropolitanate Diocese subservient to the Regulations.129
Finally, the dissent believed the majority’s statement that a court needed to intervene since Bishop Longin acted unilaterally when he filed the
amended Affidavit of Organization in 1998 was an unlikely characterization.130 The parties’ disagreement regarding the legitimacy of the amended
Affidavit of Organizations demonstrated to the dissenting justice why, in-

123. Id. ¶ 56 (Spence, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Spence, J., dissenting) (Article two conflicted with Article sixteen about
whether the Regulations expired after a three-year period or not until a common constitution
was adopted). Despite the conflicting provisions, the majority had concluded the Regulations
were clear, without making reference to Article sixteen in its analysis. Id. ¶¶ 47, 57 (Spence,
J., dissenting).
125. Id. ¶ 59 (Spence, J., dissenting).
126. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 59 (Spence, J., dissenting).
127. Id. ¶ 60 (Spence, J., dissenting).
128. Id. ¶ 64 (Spence, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Spence, J., dissenting).
130. Id. ¶ 42 (majority opinion); Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 62
(Spence, J., dissenting). The dissent stated the amended Affidavit of Organization was “on
its face . . . [a] decision of the Assembly of the Metropolitanate Diocese,” and “there [was]
no evidence that the Metropolitanate Diocese objected to the filing of the amended Affidavit
of Organization.” Id. ¶¶ 62-63 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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stead of intervening, the court should abstain from weighing in on “matters
of church governance and hierarchical structure.”131
IV. ANALYSIS
Puskar was incorrectly decided because the court failed to recognize
the religious intricacies of the dispute. Even if a judgment on the pleadings
was an improper decision by the trial court, it was wrong for the Puskar
majority to hold that the Regulations no longer remained in effect. This
case illuminates the often difficult decision of whether to apply the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine or the neutral principles of law, but the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment cannot afford
such a grave error. This section examines other Second District Appellate
Court decisions and additional relevant Illinois Appellate Court cases which
have confronted the ecclesiastical abstention and neutral principles approaches. This section compares and contrasts how those Illinois appellate
cases interact with Puskar to demonstrate that, in order for the ecclesiastical
abstention to be applied, there must be an interchurch dispute with either a
religious issue or religious authority involved, all of which should have
been acknowledged as present in Puskar.
A. INTERCHURCH CONFLICT
In order for the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to apply, regardless
of if an otherwise precluded ecclesiastical issue were involved, there must
be a dispute that arises from within a church132 or authoritative religious
organization.133 Whether an identifiable hierarchical structure existed at the
time is a crucial issue underlying Puskar. At oral arguments, Justice
Hutchinson, the author of the majority in Puskar, expressed concern that
the facts were such that an unassociated religious organization was essentially attempting to take over another church.134 Such a concern is valid. If
131. Id. ¶ 63 (Spence, J., dissenting) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. &
Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 722–23 (1976)).
132. E.g., Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305, 313-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010)
(distinguishing between “internal church matter” and subject matter not generated internally,
with the latter not triggering the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine).
133. E.g., Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 43,
46-48 (distinguishing between a clearly structured hierarchical religious governance and an
unidentifiable hierarchical structure, especially when evidence pointed to a lack of authoritative hierarchy), petition for leave to appeal denied, Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church,
21 N.E.3d 713 (Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
134. Oral Arguments at 36:20, Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U (No. 212-0847), http://multimedia.illinois.gov/court/AppellateCourt/Audio/2013/2nd/040313_212-0847.mp3.
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the Serbian Church and the Metropolitanate Diocese did not have any semblance of an authoritative hierarchical relationship, then Puskar’s majority
is correct and any reasonable person should look with a skeptical eye at the
Serbian Church attempting to force its control over the Metropolitanate
Diocese. However, if the majority is not correct, and the two churches in
fact reunified and reestablished the decades-old authoritative hierarchy,135
then the decision has put both parties in a confounded dilemma. Resolution
of reunification turns on determining if the Regulations remained in effect,
or if a common constitution had been enacted.
Three cases provide insight as to the need for a structured relationship
before a court may apply ecclesiastical deference. The first, Duncan v. Peterson,136 is perhaps the clearest example of when a dispute does not arise
from within a single church or authoritative hierarchy. Duncan came before
the Second District in 2005137 and 2010.138 The case arose after the senior
pastor of Moody Church and Moody Church elders sent Duncan, among
others, three letters which Duncan based a claim of false light invasion of
privacy.139 Duncan was at that time a pastor of Hope Church, but had received his ordination from Moody Church.140 The three letters inquired
about accusations of Duncan’s sexual impropriety, and threatened that his
ordination would be revoked if Duncan did not respond to the claims.141
The court determined the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply in
2005 due to the Moody Church’s lack of authority over Duncan.142 It reiterated in 2010 that the abstention doctrine did not apply because it was not an
interchurch dispute. 143
The second and third examples both emerge from the Fourth District.
In what would have otherwise been a straightforward property dispute, Clay
135. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
700-02 (1976) (giving the background of the American-Canadian branch of the Serbian
Orthodox Church adopting its constitution in 1927 and aligning with the authoritative hierarchical structure of the Serbian Church).
136. Duncan, 947 N.E.2d 305.
137. Duncan v. Peterson, 835 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2005).
138. Duncan, 947 N.E.2d 305.
139. Duncan, 835 N.E.2d at 414.
140. Id.; Duncan, 947 N.E.2d at 309.
141. See Duncan, 835 N.E.2d at 414-15; Duncan, 947 N.E.2d at 309-11. The third
letter informed Duncan that Moody Church rescinded his ordination because Duncan had not
attended a hearing on the allegations. Id. at 310.
142. See Duncan, 835 N.E.2d at 422 (“Deciding whether defendants published a
letter placing Duncan in a false light, by appearing to revoke Duncan's ability to be a minister and pastor at Hope Church, does not require extensive inquiry into religious law and
polity.”).
143. Duncan, 947 N.E.2d at 314 (“[T]he Moody Church has no authority over Hope
Church and, hence, the dissemination of the letters at issue was not an internal procedure of
the Moody Church.”).
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v. Illinois District Council of Assemblies of God Church confronted the
reversion of a property deed between a local Assemblies of God Church
and its higher religious affiliate, the Illinois District Council.144 The local
church’s bylaws provided that church property would revert to the Illinois
District Council if the church “ceased to function as an Assemblies of God
Church.”145 Even though the court agreed the “ceased to function” phrase
was ambiguous and ambiguous contractual terms were usually resolved by
a court, neutral principles were inappropriate because the ambiguity turned
on the meaning of what it meant to “function as an Assemblies of God
Church.”146 Neutral principles were not to be used when an ambiguity concerned an ecclesiastical issue.147 As a church polity issue between two hierarchical connected religious organizations, the court thereby deferred to the
Illinois District Council’s conclusion that the local church had indeed
ceased to function as an Assemblies of God Church.148
In Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, the Diocese of Quincy
(“Diocese”) voted to dissociate from the Episcopal Church, upon which the
Episcopal Church attempted to freeze over three million dollars held in the
Diocese’s bank account.149 The two issues presented were the structure of
the church and ownership of the funds.150 The Diocese had been associated
with the Episcopal Church, although the relationship had not been sufficiently formal and controlling, the Diocese’s constitution and bylaws did
not mention a hierarchical structure, and the Episcopal Church lacked supreme authority.151 Of added importance, the control of church funds and
the bank account funds had always been handled exclusively by Diocese
trustees.152 The Episcopal Church wanted the court to apply deference to its
authority over the Diocese and its right to the disputed property, but the
court declined as strict deference was not applicable when “determination
of a church’s hierarchal structure [was] not easily discernible.”153 Since
religious deference was not applicable, neutral principles were appropriate

144. See Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God Church, 657 N.E.2d 688,
689-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
145. Id. at 693.
146. Id. at 692-93.
147. See id. at 693.
148. Id. at 693-94.
149. See Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶ 1,
petition for leave to appeal denied, Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 21 N.E.3d 713
(Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
150. See id. ¶¶ 46, 50.
151. See id. ¶¶ 6, 20-23, 48.
152. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 54.
153. See id. ¶¶ 46-48 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church
of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369–70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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to resolve ownership of the property.154 The court ultimately held in favor
of the Diocese, because the Episcopal Church had never been a beneficiary
of the account or been involved with the account in any way, nor had the
account ever been held in trust for the Episcopal Church.155
Two takeaways can be gleaned from the three case examples concerning the need for a religiously structured relationship: (1) An outside church
or religious organization or a non-interchurch dispute does not trigger the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine;156 and (2) the language of a church’s bylaws and constitution could be demonstrative in the application of ecclesiastical deference or abstention.157 In light of that reality, two questions may
be raised in regards to Puskar: Is the Serbian Church an outside organization attempting to assert unjustified authoritative influence over the Metropolitanate Diocese? And does language in either the Regulations or a common constitution establish a hierarchical relationship? Both questions obviously turn on the status of reunification, whether the Regulations remained
in effect or if a common constitution had been adopted.
Puskar’s majority framed the facts in a similar manner to Duncan in
the way that the Serbian Church should be considered an entirely unassociated religious authority since the “clear” terms indicate the Regulations
expired after three years, and by extension Bishop Longin did not apparently have the authority to authorize a formal reunification.158 The facts of the
case lead to the opposite conclusion. As the dissent pointed out, the terms
of the Regulation are anything but clear, and the parties acted like the Regulations remained in effect.159 Most obviously, Article two conflicts with
Article sixteen as to the duration of the Regulations.160 Unfortunately, the
majority did not address this discrepancy in its analysis. Plaintiffs at oral
arguments before the Second District conceded that some provisions of the
Regulations were not clear and contained ambiguous parts, although per154. See Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 4749, petition for leave to appeal denied, Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 21 N.E.3d
713 (Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
155. Id. ¶¶ 50, 54-55.
156. See Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305, 313-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010)
(distinguishing between “internal church matter” and subject matter not generated internally,
with the latter not triggering the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine).
157. See Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God Church, 657 N.E.2d 688,
693-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995) (holding ecclesiastical deference was required even
though local church constitution required a yet to be satisfied two-thirds vote to transfer
property, because ambiguous term in the bylaws wasn't an impermissible religious inquiry);
Diocese of Quincy, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 22, 47-48 (holding ecclesiastical deference was not required despite hierarchical type relationship, because evidence demonstrated
constitution did not establish formal authority by the hierarchy).
158. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 47 (majority opinion).
159. See id. ¶ 56 (Spence, J., dissenting).
160. See id. ¶¶ 7, 26; id.¶ 58 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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haps the conflicting terms were explainable as wishful thinking on the part
of parties hoping for reunification.161 In regard to the appointment of Bishop Longin as administrator over the Metropolitanate Diocese by the Serbian
Church,162 and his election as Diocesan Bishop a year later,163 the majority
neglected to address this timeline. To say that the Regulations expired in
1995, even though the appointment and election of Bishop Longin took
place in 1998 and 1999 in accordance with Articles Five and Six of the
Regulations, is puzzling.164 At trial, Bishop Longin presented the evidence
of the Metropolitanate Diocese’s newspaper and his participation in the
1999 meetings with the Serbian Church on behalf of the Metropolitanate
Diocese, which also serves to undermine the majority’s conclusion that the
Regulations had expired four years earlier.165 A picture begins to emerge,
and it is not one of a hostile takeover by a hierarchical authority, but that a
meaningful reunification had transpired guided by the Regulations.
The majority believed it was worth mentioning that the Regulations allotted for a “specific time and place” to meet where the Regulations would
expire,166 yet it did not determine if evidence existed that such a meeting or
confirmed termination of the Regulations ever took place. Plaintiffs did not
assert that such a meeting took place. Additionally, a rather significant, yet
not unexpected, opinion comes from a New Jersey appellate court where
Bishop Longin was likewise a defendant against a former parishioner.167
Although the viability of the Regulations was not part of the dispute, reunification was accepted as fact in that the court dictated:
In 1991, the Free Serbian Orthodox Church reunified with
the Mother Church in Belgrade and recognized the Mother
Church as the supreme authority. Subsequently, the Mother Church sent defendant Longin from Belgrade to the
United States as an auxiliary bishop in 1997. Shortly thereafter, on May 5, 1999, he became bishop of the diocese.168
What makes Beljakovic v. Longin significant is how the facts of the
process of reunification and Bishop Longin’s appointment and election in
161. Oral Arguments at 07:36, 21:26, Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U,
http://multimedia.illinois.gov/court/AppellateCourt/Audio/2013/2nd/040313_2-120847.mp3.
162. Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 2; id. ¶ 60 (Spence, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See id. ¶ 8.
165. Id. ¶¶ 28, 47.
166. Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 47 (majority opinion).
167. See Beljakovic v. Longin, No. A-5330-09T4, 2011 WL 3179105, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 28, 2011).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
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Puskar support the exact assertion made by the New Jersey appellate court:
that a reunification took place.169 The difference is only that in Beljakovic
reunification was accepted without the need to litigate over the admittedly
confusing and conflicting terms of the Regulations. The contract dispute
over the Regulations tends only to distract from the fact that the churches
were not organizationally separate entities, and that the Metropolitanate
Diocese submitted to the wide-ranging authority Bishop Longin had been
given.
The history of the two churches is of vital importance in order to understand the significance of the process of reunification that took place. In
1921, the American-Canadian branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church was
formally established.170 In 1927, in a unifying effort among Serbian congregations in America and Canada, a constitution was adopted to govern the
American-Canadian branch.171 From 1921 through the breakup of the
branch in 1963, “each bishop who governed the American-Canadian Diocese was a Yugoslav citizen appointed by the Mother Church without consultation with Diocesan officials.”172 Furthermore, according to the 1927
constitution, an appointed bishop had “extensive powers with respect to
both religious matters and control of Diocesan property.”173 The significance of the former hierarchical relationship and the ability for the Serbian
Church to appoint a bishop cannot be glossed over considering that the
Metropolitanate Diocese sought out reunification in the early 1990s and,
once again, allowed the Serbian Church, i.e., the Mother Church, to appoint
a bishop over them.174 A comparison to Duncan where the Moody Church
did not have authority over the Hope Church at any point in time is inappropriate given the history and present circumstances of Puskar.175 It is
undisputed that the Metropolitanate Diocese was completely autonomous
from the Serbian Church for a period of almost thirty years, in large part
due to the government in the former Yugoslavia.176 Yet, it is also undisputed that the leadership of the Metropolitanate Diocese in 1992 approved the
Regulations thereby submitting the Metropolitanate Diocese to the Serbian
169. See id. (matter-of-factly asserting “[s]oon after the reunification”).
170. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 700 (1976). The American-Canadian branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church was the
predecessor organization to the Metropolitanate Diocese prior to the disbandment from the
Mother Church in Serbia in 1963. See id. at 704-05; Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶
3.
171. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 700.
172. Id. at 700-01.
173. Id. at 701.
174. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 6, 8.
175. See Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010).
176. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 6-8; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 704,
706.
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Church’s authority.177 The Regulations included Articles five and six which
allowed the Serbian Church to appoint an administrator or bishop to a vacant position within the Metropolitanate Diocese,178 a method that appears
almost identical to the articles of the 1927 constitution.179 The control over
property and governance given to a diocesan bishop under the 1927 constitution and the Regulations is also similar.180 It is unsound to agree with
Puskar that no official reunification had transpired and that the Regulations
had expired before Bishop Longin was appointed administrative Bishop and
later elected Diocesan bishop over the Metropolitanate Diocese.181 Moreover, unlike Diocese of Quincy where, despite a relationship which appeared
hierarchical, the Diocese’s constitution and other documents did not give
the Episcopal Church formal authority,182 here the Regulations reestablished the former hierarchical authority, even if they were to be used only
until the constitution could be enacted.
Puskar’s dissenting Justice alluded to the fact that the court was not in
a position to determine the viability of the Regulations without violating the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine since it was not clear the Regulations still
governed the Metropolitanate Diocese, although the dissent did go on to
assess why evidence supported that the Regulations remained in effect.183 In
177. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 6-7 (citing Article two, the opinion
stated, “the Metropolitanate Diocese shall be governed based on the ‘Holy Scripture and
Holy Tradition’ of the [Serbian] Church; the Regulations recognized and adopted by the
[Serbian] Church; the Transitional Regulations ‘in the spirit of the Constitution’ of the [Serbian] Church; and the provisions of the Metropolitanate Diocese’s Constitution that did not
conflict with the Transitional Regulations.” Id. ¶ 64.).
178. Id. ¶ 7.
179. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 701.
180. Compare Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 7-9, 15 (“[I]n his role as
bishop, Bishop Longin had possession and control of this property and other tangible and
intangible property belonging to the Metropolitanate Diocese. The Bishop also had exclusive
control over who could conduct religious services in the Monastery and who had access to
the seminary building, picnic grounds, and cemetery. In addition, all dues collected by the
Metropolitanate Diocese were forwarded to him.”), with Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 701
(“Bishop [had] extensive powers with respect to both religious matters and control of Diocesan property.”).
181. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 8.
182. See Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 6,
20-23, 48, petition for leave to appeal denied, Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 21
N.E.3d 713 (Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
183. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 56-60 (Spence, J., dissenting). The
dissent cited St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios to support the proposition that “the
autonomy of the Metropolitanate Diocese” could not be determined by analyzing the Regulations “without improperly delving into issues of church doctrine and polity” based on
Tanios’s specific ecclesiastical issue of whether a new set of bylaws had been adopted. Id. ¶
56 (Spence, J., dissenting) (citing St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d
283, 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991)). But the dissent may have been conflating a court
inquiring into a religious issue compared to a court determining whether deference should be
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a similar vein to the dissent’s concern, a potential problem does arise. The
thoroughly reasoned opinion Bruss v. Przybylo quoted Milivojevich to warn
against a court entangling itself in ecclesiastical matters by studying church
polity in an attempt to understand a hierarchical structure.184 Bruss’s alternative is to “rest the abstention decision entirely on the subject matter of the
dispute,” which is true and will be discussed.185 The warning against entanglement, even if used for the purpose of applying abstention supplemental
to the subject matter, should certainly be taken under advisement,186 yet it is
not entirely applicable to Puskar for two reasons. First, the subject matter of
the dispute itself in Puskar offers adequate reason for abstention.187 Second,
in order for the court to defer to a decision of the highest ecclesiastical authority, the court would need to be sure it knows the answer to the question,
“deference to whom?” Ensuring reunification had occurred or that the Regulations remained in effect was central to deference to the proper authority.
Without any likelihood of reunification, Bishop Longin would have owed a
duty to the governing body of the Metropolitanate Diocese; yet if reunification had occurred in whole or while still under the governance of the Regulations his duty would be to the Serbian Church.188
An auxiliary concern is Justice Brennan’s concurrence in the plurality
opinion Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God (“Maryland
& Virginia Churches”) which, according to Diocese of Quincy, stated that
deference was impermissible when a court could not easily discern a
church’s hierarchal structure.189 Yet, Maryland & Virginia Churches, as
cited by Milivojevich, prohibits a court from inquiring into the hierarchical
structure of a church to the extent that it would be interpreting “ambiguous
religious law and usage.”190 Understanding reunification in Puskar or the
applied. That is because the Tanios court was not prohibited from analyzing the hierarchical
nature of the churches and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the new bylaws,
which were eventually held to be invalid since the court deferred to the decision of the highest religious authority. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d at 292-94.
184. See Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008)
(citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 722-23
(1976)).
185. Id. at 1121.
186. See id.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 198-206, 250-93.
188. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 16-18.
189. See Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶ 47
(citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc.,
396 U.S. 367, 369–70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)), petition for leave to appeal denied,
Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church, 21 N.E.3d 713 (Ill. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
190. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09 (1976) (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 369-70
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
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Regulations would not require the court to cross that line into impermissible
interpretation. The unique circumstances of Puskar make the examinations
into the Regulations, the history of the Metropolitanate Diocese and the
Serbian Church, and the hierarchical structure necessary only to the extent
required to determine whether some authoritative relationship existed. The
Diocese of Quincy’s use of a neutral principles approach if the hierarchical
structure was not easily discernible is applicable to Puskar to the extent the
court would need to analyze the hierarchical structure for purposes of discerning an ecclesiastical authority, but Puskar would ultimately reach a
conclusion opposite to Diocese of Quincy.191
The warnings expressed in Bruss192 and Maryland & Virginia Church193
es have not been interpreted as strict prohibitions. It is clear that a court
may look at necessary documentation or relevant evidence in order to determine whether an ecclesiastical issue is present or deference needs to be
applied, even if religious documentation on its face appears religiously incorporated.194 As far as the dissent’s concern with impermissibly determining the viability of the Regulations, Clay195 and Diocese of Quincy,196
among others, advance the notion that a court is permitted to initially look
at all necessary documents and terms before deciding whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine need be applied.197
191. See Diocese of Quincy, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 47-48 (finding no formal
hierarchical relationship existed).
192. See Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008)
(citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 722-23
(1976)).
193. See Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 369-70 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
194. E.g., Diocese of Quincy, 2014 IL App (4th) 130901, ¶¶ 6, 20-27, 46-48 (court
assessed founding documents, each church constitution, and other evidence to determine
whether a formal hierarchical structure existed before it could decide the ownership of bank
account); Susan v. Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of Am., 2012 IL App (1st) 120697-U, ¶¶
1, 8, 10 (court looked at the bylaws and hierarchical structure of the church to conclude
religiously incorporated bylaws required deference to the higher authority's decision).
195. The Clay court looked at the real estate title, articles of the church constitution
and bylaws, and the bylaws of the hierarchical organization to ultimately conclude the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied. See Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God
Church, 657 N.E.2d 688, 689-91, 693-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
196. The Diocese of Quincy court looked at church constitutions and cannons, the
contract between the Diocese and the bank, the Diocese articles of incorporation, relevant
witness testimony, and the structure of the relationship of the churches to ultimately conclude ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply. See Diocese of Quincy, 2014 IL App
(4th) 130901, ¶¶ 6-8, 19-26, 48, 52, 54.
197. E.g., St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283, 285-87, 29294 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (reviewing 1969, 1978, 1988, and 1989 bylaws to conclude
deference to highest ecclesiastical authority required in accordance with the provisions of the
1969 and 1978 bylaws). See also Young & Tiggs, supra note 7.
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B. THE APPLICATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION OR
DEFERENCE
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine may be applied in two forms: a
civil court might need to either abstain from inserting itself into a religious
dispute or defer to the appropriate religious authority.198 Such a realization
is important when considering the fact that it undertones the general application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and the fact that Puskar
could have been dismissed through either of the doctrine’s applications. As
will be elaborated upon, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine should have
been triggered since the subject matter of Plaintiff’s complaint was religious in nature because it concerned the role and responsibility of Bishop
Longin, a clergy member,199 and the Serbian Church has an established
hierarchical authority.200
Given that sufficient evidence existed to cast doubt on the Puskar majority’s conclusion that the Regulations expired almost fifteen years prior to
commencement of the litigation,201 whether the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine applied to the subject matter of the dispute could have been addressed. In addition to the authoritative structure, the heart of the Plaintiffs’
complaint concerned the proper role and authority of Bishop Longin in his
capacity as bishop.202 In fact, asking a court to determine Bishop Longin’s
duty of loyalty to either the Metropolitanate Diocese or the Serbian Church
comprises an identical ecclesiastical question. Another issue present in Puskar was the amended Affidavit of Organization Bishop Longin filed in
1998 on behalf of the Metropolitanate Diocese, which stated that since 1992
the Metropolitanate Diocese had been governed by the Regulations under
the hierarchical authority of the Serbian Church.203 An Affidavit of Organization has a significant legal effect for a church or religious organization.204
198. See Tanios, 572 N.E.2d at 293-94 (deferring to the decision of what the parties
agreed was as the church's highest authority); accord Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102,
1123, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008) (abstaining from a decision because the suit's subject matter of a pastor's fitness was ecclesiastical in nature). See also Stepek v. Doe, 910
N.E.2d 655, 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009) (whether alleged statements were defamatory
was not an inherently religious matter, yet since the statements were made in a church tribunal adjudicatory deference was required).
199. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 31.
200. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 699, 701 (1976) (outlining the history and structure of the Serbian Orthodox Church).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 133-97.
202. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 15-16, 31 (plaintiffs asking for
injunction that Bishop Longin owed a duty of loyalty to the Metropolitanate Diocese).
203. See id. ¶¶ 20, 25; id. ¶ 62 (Spence, J., dissenting).
204. E.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/46b (effective July 7, 1999) (incorporating a
religious organization under Illinois law).
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The majority dismissed the relevance of Bishop Longin’s actions regarding
the Affidavit of Organization since the Regulations had already expired,
while the dissent believed determining the validity of Bishop Longin’s actions would be an impermissible inquiry into an ecclesiastical matter.205 The
last potential ecclesiastical issue would be the ability for the Serbian
Church to restructure the Metropolitanate Diocese into an existing diocese.206 Questions of both ecclesiastical deference and abstention run
throughout Puskar because of the hierarchical nature of the church and
Bishop Longin’s functioning as a clergy. The following Illinois appellate
court cases examine the ecclesiastical and neutral principle approaches.
Five Second District cases offer insight into whether the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine would be triggered. The court in three of the cases was
barred from exercising subject matter jurisdiction due to the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, while the other two cases were able to adjudge the dispute based on neutral principles. St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios involved a property control dispute between two factions within the St.
Mark Coptic Orthodox Church of Chicago (“Chicago parish”), which was a
part of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt.207 Among other issues, the
“Church faction” and the “Tanios faction” disagreed whether the 1988 version of the Chicago parish’s constitution and bylaws had taken effect when
they had been adopted by most of the Chicago parish’s board, but never by
the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt.208 The 1988 bylaws
could have allowed the Tanios faction to seize control of church property
and bank accounts.209 The court ultimately affirmed the application of strict
deference to the religious authority’s decision rather than using a neutral
principles approach.210 Although the disagreement between the two factions
involved control of property, the “hierarchical nature of the Coptic Orthodox Church” required approval from the highest religious authority as stated in the 1969 and 1978 bylaws, yet such approval had not been given.211
Hines v. Turley addressed a congregational dispute over support for
the pastor and his use of church funds, and whether to dissolve the church
due to disruptions in the services and a lack of leadership.212 The trial court
characterized the issue as a disagreement over “property rights between
205. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 47 (majority opinion); id. ¶¶ 54, 63
(Spence, J., dissenting).
206. See id. ¶¶ 14, 20.
207. St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283, 284 (Ill. App. Ct.
2d Dist. 1991).
208. Id. at 287-89, 292.
209. See id. at 287-90.
210. Id. at 290, 294.
211. Id. at 291-92, 294-95.
212. See Hines v. Turley, 615 N.E.2d 1251, 1252-54, 1256-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1993).
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factions of a church” finding that the application of neutral principles was
appropriate.213 Since no discernible leadership was operating the church, the
trial court would have ruled in favor of dissolution because “the church had
been abandoned by its members and therefore its purposes were frustrated.”214 Arriving as an interlocutory appeal, the Hines court instead noted the
foundational issue was “who [would] be the pastor” of the church.215 Even
though the church had not followed its own procedures in voting and
church purposes were disrupted, the “underlying dispute” was ecclesiastical
in nature and therefore the First Amendment precluded jurisdiction.216
An important case for the Second District, and also one mentioned by
the majority and dissent in Puskar,217 is Bruss v. Przybylo.218 Former members of a church brought suit against the priest and members of the board
alleging that the priest should be terminated for reasons that he was no
longer fit to remain in his position.219 The court characterized the disagreement as whether it was “ultimately about property rights” because church
property and assets were at stake, or whether it was “principally about [the
priest’s] fitness as a pastor” and if certain members were qualified to
vote.220 Bruss undertook a lengthy and in-depth analysis of constitutional
history and relevant jurisprudence.221 Even though control of property could
be affected by the outcome, the court would have been required to “judge
the qualifications and fitness” of the pastor, thus the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied.222
The two examples of a neutral principles analysis are Apostolic New
Life Church of Elgin v. Dominquez223 and Duncan.224 Duncan was able to
apply neutral principles since the subject matter of false light invasion of

213. Id. at 1257.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1257, 1260.
216. See id. at 1259-61.
217. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 39, 65.
218. Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008).
219. See id. at 1105-07.
220. See id. at 1111, 1124.
221. See id. at 1111-22, 1125. The Bruss court first reviewed Supreme Court history
of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See id. at 1111-19. Since after its review, the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to congregational churches rather than
just hierarchical churches was left unresolved, the court looked to various lower court decisions. See Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1119-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008). It
determined that the doctrine equally applied to hierarchical and congregational churches. See
id. at 1123.
222. See id. at 1123-25.
223. Apostolic New Life Church of Elgin v. Dominquez, 686 N.E.2d 1187, 1188 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 136-43.
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privacy was determined to not be an ecclesiastical issue, and the lack of an
interchurch conflict meant ecclesiastical deference was not involved.225
In Dominquez, members of a congregationally-structured church voted
unanimously to merge with the former parent church, and two years later a
majority “voted to change title to the church property and to dissolve” their
present church as a religious corporation.226 When no prohibited religious
issues appeared present, the court applied neutral principles to determine
the validity of the congregational vote and “who own[ed] and control[led]
the church property.”227 After examining “the constitutions and bylaws,
state statutes, the deed conveying the church property in question, and other
evidence,” the court concluded the merger and dissolution were proper.228
Neither the constitution nor bylaws of the former church authorized or prohibited a merger, thus it was sufficient that no statutes prohibited the transition and other evidence proved a majority of members had given approval.229
Three cases from the First District provide adequate comparison to
Puskar, two of which applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Ervin v.
Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church concerned the church
board’s removal of Reverend Ervin for improper alcohol use in violation of
the church employee handbook.230 The problem, though, was that the bylaws of the church required congregational approval in order to terminate a
pastor.231 Referencing back to the “constitutional protection” against improper methods of selecting clergy from Kedroff in 1952, the Ervin court
stated that selection of clergy must adhere to a church’s own laws.232 Therefore, since the court was only required to interpret church bylaws, which
could be done using neutral principles, and since the church had not adhered to its own bylaws, the Reverend’s termination was held to be improper.233

225. See Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305, 312, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010).
226. Dominquez, 686 N.E.2d at 1192-94, 1195-96.
227. Id. at 1191.
228. Id. at 1195-96.
229. See id. at 1192-96.
230. Ervin v. Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 813 N.E.2d 1073,
1074-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
231. Id. at 1074.
232. Id. at 1077. It is worth noting that Bruss disagreed with Ervin's characterization
of a court looking into whether a church followed its own procedures. See Bruss v. Przybylo,
895 N.E.2d 1102, 1115 n.8 (2008). Bruss believed Ervin cited outdated dicta from Kedroff
and misconstrued Milivojevich, because Milivojevich stated a court could not examine
whether an ecclesiastical tribunal followed its own church laws, even though Ervin allowed
such an inquiry. See id.
233. Ervin, 813 N.E.2d at 1078.
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In an unreported decision which distinguished itself from Ervin, the
court in Susan v. Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of America addressed the
transfer of an allegedly disloyal priest to an alternative diocese by the
Archbishop of the hierarchical church.234 The priest claimed that the church
alone could transfer a priest for disciplinary reasons.235 Unlike Ervin, the
Romanian Orthodox Church did not release its jurisdiction and the bylaws
gave the Archbishop implied authority for such a transfer; yet the bylaws
also incorporated the “Holy Canons of the Orthodox Christian Church.”236
The court saw the issue as precisely the type the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine forbade, because the Archbishop’s authority to transfer the priest
or handle disciplinary matters was derived not only from the bylaws, but
also church canonical law, which the court was prohibited from interpreting.237
In Stepek v. Doe, a former priest brought a defamation claim against
two former parishioners who claimed the priest had sexually abused them
when they were minors.238 A Catholic review board heard the allegations
against the priest, upon which the Archbishop of Chicago decreed to remove the priest from his role in ministry.239 The ecclesiastical nature of the
dispute was not because the court was prohibited from interpreting the relevant church doctrines.240 Instead, the key distinction was that jurisdiction
was precluded because the claims were made during an “internal church
disciplinary proceeding,” and a religious tribunal had determined the
priest’s fate.241
From the Third District, Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran
Church addressed a contract dispute over whether the church had adhered
to the negotiated severance pay with its former pastor.242 The church argued
the contract claim was related to the pastor’s dismissal but a neutral principles approach was appropriate.243 The reasons for the pastor’s resignation
were not involved, and so the court stated “[t]he contractual issue of com-

234. See Susan v. Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of Am., 2012 IL App (1st)
120697-U, ¶ 2.
235. Id. ¶ 3.
236. See id. ¶¶ 8-11.
237. See id. ¶¶ 1, 9-10.
238. See Stepek v. Doe, 910 N.E.2d 655, 656-57, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009).
239. See id. at 659-61.
240. See id. at 668.
241. See id. at 667-69 (the court distinguished the facts from the Second District case
Duncan v. Peterson because the unfitness of the priest was handled entirely from within the
church).
242. See Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1209-10
(Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2005).
243. See id. at 1211.
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pensation due” was not an ecclesiastical issue.244 Significant also was that
the church’s bylaws specifically allowed civil court jurisdiction over nonecclesiastical contract disputes.245
Lastly, in Bivin v. Wright, the Bivins initiated a complaint against the
pastor of the First Baptist Church of Energy for the pastor’s extramarital
affair with Mrs. Bivin during the course of marriage counseling.246 As a
result of the affair, the Bivins alleged psychological damage to the marriage
and medical expenditures related to Mrs. Bivin contracting two sexually
transmitted diseases.247 The court overturned the trial court’s dismissal of
the complaint because the pastor’s “sexual misconduct was not rooted in
the church’s religious beliefs,” and therefore on remand neutral principles
would be appropriate so long as no other religious issues were present.248
Stepek v. Doe later drew a distinction between its facts and Bivin because of
the context in which the sexual misconduct allegations were put forth in a
disciplinary tribunal.249
C. APPLICATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION AND
DEFERENCE TO PUSKAR
The aforementioned Illinois appellate cases examined next to Puskar
show how both ecclesiastical abstention based on the subject matter of Puskar and ecclesiastical deference could have applied. Susan v. Romanian
Orthodox Episcopate of America out of the Third District is the quintessential example of the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
through both deference and abstention, and one that is a fitting comparison
to Puskar. The ecclesiastical nature of the dispute in Susan was the Archbishop’s authority under the religiously incorporated constitution and bylaws, which could be stated the same for Puskar.250 The court in Susan was
therefore prohibited from determining the validity of the disciplinary trans244. Id. at 1212-13.
245. See id. at 1211-13.
246. Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995).
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1124-25.
249. See Stepek v. Doe, 910 N.E.2d 655, 668-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009).
250. Susan v. Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of Am., 2012 IL App (1st) 120697-U,
¶ 16 (“The bishop's authority over disciplinary and personnel matters springs not only from
the constitution and bylaws of the ROEA but also from OCA canon law, so any inquiry that
we were to make in this case would require us to construe matters of religious doctrine. That
is something that we cannot do.”). With Puskar, the Regulations could be considered to be
religiously incorporated since they specifically reference the “Holy Scriptures and Holy
Tradition” of the Serbian Church, in addition to the fact that both the Metropolitanate Diocese's and the Serbian Church's constitutions also incorporated religious doctrine. See Puskar
v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 7.
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fer of the priest, and with Puskar, Bishop Longin’s responsibility towards
church property and even his filing of the amended Affidavit of Organization would be impermissible inquiries into matters of religious doctrine.251
The Susan court’s deference to an ecclesiastical authority came in the form
of the court being barred from looking into a tort claim based on statements
made during a disciplinary tribunal;252 likewise, in Puskar the higher authority that would trigger the courts need for ecclesiastical deference was
the Serbian Church by way of reunification or the Regulations.253
Puskar resembles Tanios in considering that the Metropolitanate Diocese was in a legally similar position to the Tainos faction.254 The Tainos
faction incorrectly claimed control of property under the 1988 bylaws,
which had never been formally enacted;255 whereas Plaintiffs in Puskar
claimed Bishop Longin owed only the Metropolitanate Diocese a duty of
loyalty concerning control of property,256 despite the evidence that would
demonstrate the Regulations had not expired after three years.257 Like in
Tainos where deference to the decision of the Coptic Orthodox Church of
Egypt regarding the 1988 bylaws was required, the Serbian Church would
hold final authority over Bishop Longin’s activity as a result of either reunification or the continuing governance under the Regulations. Tainos is a
more straightforward decision since the parties agreed the Coptic Orthodox
Church of Egypt was the hierarchical authority,258 but, as discussed, following the necessary analysis the same could be said regarding the hierarchical
authority of the Serbian Church.
A congregation split over support for a church leader that could determine the outcome of the continued existence of the church was ecclesiasti251. See Susan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120697-U, ¶¶ 10, 15 (determining the extent of a
minister's authority under religiously incorporated constitution prohibited by ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine); Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 9, 14; see also Bruss v.
Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1124-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008) (“The case law is almost
entirely consistent. Ministerial qualifications and appointments to church offices are essentially and entirely doctrinal decisions.”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 7.25 (1997)). Bruss went on to survey each Federal Circuit
to support its claim that pastoral fitness and the status between a pastor and a church are
ecclesiastical matters. See id.
252. See Susan, 2012 IL App (1st) 120697-U, ¶¶ 14-15.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 133-97.
254. The holding of Tanios was that by the highest authority in an ecclesiastically
hierarchical church not approving the proposed bylaws that could have affected the control
of property, the court was required to defer to the decision of the hierarchical authority and
refrain from intervening into whether the bylaws were valid. See generally St. Mark Coptic
Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991).
255. See Tanios, 572 N.E.2d at 289-90, 293-94.
256. Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 16.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 133-97.
258. See Tanios, 572 N.E.2d at 293.
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cal in nature.259 Hines echoes the reality that a disagreement over the proper
selection and continued role as a clergy remain ecclesiastical issues.260
Hines’s comparability with Puskar is evident in the way the dispute was not
soluble by neutrally determining who controlled property or by interpreting
a contract; it should have instead turned on the proper appointment of Bishop Longin and his actions as a clergy, which are ecclesiastical issues.261
Similar to Hines, Bruss dealt with an issue of determining a pastor’s
fitness to lead a church disguised as a dispute over church property, which
triggered the court’s abstention.262 The facts of Bruss are distinguishable
from Puskar, to the extent the dissent recognized, because whether Bishop
Longin was fit to serve in his position as bishop was not at issue.263 However, also noted by the dissent, Bruss offers a key component of the rule of
law apropos to Puskar—that the selection and retention of clergy is strictly
ecclesiastical264—because Bishop Longin’s selection as bishop and his role
therein are at issue.265 Bishop Longin was first appointed and then elected
as bishop over the Metropolitanate Diocese thereby receiving control over
conducting worship services and control over property according to the
doctrinally incorporated Regulations.266 Whether Bishop Longin exceeded
the scope of his authority as bishop over the Metropolitanate Diocese is, as
259. See generally Hines v. Turley, 615 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993).
260. See Hines, 615 N.E.2d at 1260-61 (determining who would be the pastor of the
church was an ecclesiastical matter regardless of if bylaws had been violated by the pastor
and the pastor's supporters or if the court did not need to inquire about the church's religious
positions).
261. E.g., Hines, 615 N.E.2d at 1260-61. See also Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847U, ¶ 65 (Spence, J., dissenting) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717 (1976) and Rentz v. Werner, 232 P.3d 1169, 1178 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2010) for support that the duty of a clergy is an ecclesiastical issue); Bruss v.
Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1124-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008) (selecting clergy members
is an ecclesiastical issue).
262. See generally Bruss, 895 N.E.2d 1102.
263. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 65 (Spence, J., dissenting).
264. See Bruss, 895 N.E.2d at 1124-25 (“The case law is almost entirely consistent.
Ministerial qualifications and appointments to church offices are essentially and entirely
doctrinal decisions.”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
LAW § 7.25 (1997)). Bruss went on to survey each Federal Circuit to support its claim that
pastoral fitness and the status between a pastor and a church are ecclesiastical matters. See
id.
265. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 65 (Spence, J., dissenting) (citing
Bruss for its requirement that application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine rests on the
subject matter of the dispute); Bruss, 895 N.E.2d at 1124-25. But cf. Bivin v. Wright, 656
N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine was not
triggered because the pastor's actions involved sexual misconduct which did “not call into
question the church's religious beliefs or practices or subject them to analysis or scrutiny,”
nor was the court required to interpret “church doctrine or any regulation of the ecclesiastical
activity”).
266. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 7-9, 15, 66.
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far as Bruss is concerned, an entirely ecclesiastical matter. Bruss also clearly stands for the rule that the subject matter of the dispute alone controls the
application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,267 and in Puskar the
subject matter concerned the ecclesiastical issues of the role and loyalty of a
clergy.
Concluding the Second District cases is Clay, where the concepts of
deference and abstention underlie the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.268 Clay’s value to Puskar is seen in the way Clay deferred
to the hierarchical authority of the Illinois District Council and was required
to abstain from answering the religious question of what it meant to function as an Assemblies of God church.269 Puskar, post analysis of the application of the Regulations or reunification,270 should have deferred to the
Serbian Church’s hierarchical authority and refrained from addressing the
ecclesiastical nature of Bishop Longin’s authority and actions within the
Metropolitanate Diocese in like fashion to Clay. The language of “ceased to
function as an Assemblies of God Church” was written into the church constitution in Clay,271 and Bishop Longin’s authority and control over property appears regulated by the Regulations and each respective constitution,272
but it is also inherent in the history of the church.273 An advantageous difference for Puskar is that in Clay the trustees of the local church had purchased the property in question and actual ownership of the property was
involved in the dispute,274 but in Puskar the Metropolitanate Diocese gave
control of property to an appointed bishop, not ownership.275 The outcome
of a complete organizational disassociation and transfer of property, the
likes of which occurred as a result of Milivojevich,276 does not need to be
speculated upon here whether the Metropolitanate Diocese and the Serbian
Church desired such a total separation. Application of the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine to Puskar would mean only that the issues surrounding
Bishop Longin needed to be resolved by the churches, not Illinois courts.
The subject matter of Stepek is distinguishable from Puskar in the
same way Bivin is distinguishable, because Stepek and Bivin both turned on
267. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 65 (Spence, J., dissenting) (citing
Bruss, 895 N.E.2d at 1124-25).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
269. See Clay v. Ill. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God Church, 657 N.E.2d 688,
693 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 133-97.
271. Clay, 657 N.E.2d at 693.
272. Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 7, 9.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 170-82.
274. See Clay, 657 N.E.2d at 689-91.
275. See Puskar, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶¶ 7-9, 15-16.
276. See id. ¶ 3.
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the fitness of a clergy and allegations of sexual misconduct.277 Yet Stepek
involved a religious tribunal and so the court granted ecclesiastical deference to the disciplinary proceedings, thus Stepek is an appropriate companion to Puskar to the extent each court could properly apply deference.278
Bishop Longin had been given authority by the Serbian Church by way of
the Regulations, and so the decisions of the Serbian Church’s established
authority would determine his operation as a bishop, just like the Catholic
disciplinary board in determining the priest’s fate in Stepek.279 Application
of ecclesiastical abstention in Puskar is further strengthened by the fact that
its subject matter of the role of Bishop Longin is an ecclesiastical issue,
which was lacking in Stepek.280 Bivin remains divergent from Puskar since
its subject matter did not involve a religious issue that could have otherwise
possibly precluded jurisdiction, and Bivin did not contain Stepek’s key distinction of an internal disciplinary, and thus, was able to apply neutral principles.281
Next to Bivin, the Illinois appellate cases that applied neutral principles emerge as adequately dissimilar to Puskar. In Dominquez, the congregational majority voted to merge with another church and transfer its property and therefore the court was not prohibited from looking into and affirming the voting majority’s decisions.282 While Puskar could initially
review the necessary documentation to detect the presence of an ecclesiastical issue in a semi-analogous manner to Dominquez,283 the ecclesiastical
issues of a hierarchical authority and the role of a clergy weaved throughout
Puskar differentiate it from Dominquez.284 Likewise, a libel suit due to allegations against a pastor’s fitness coming from outside the immediate church
was not an impermissible religious inquiry for the Duncan court.285 Duncan
277. See Stepek v. Doe, 910 N.E.2d 655, 666, 668-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2009);
Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995).
278. Stepek, 910 N.E.2d at 668-69.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 668-69 (determining the former priest's defamation claim due to allegations of sexual misconduct would have been a “regulation of ecclesiastical activity,” but it
was only because of the disciplinary tribunal that deference was mandated; it was not because church doctrine needed to be interpreted).
281. See Bivin, 656 N.E.2d at 1124-25 (pastor's actions involving sexual misconduct
did “not call into question the church's religious beliefs or practices or subject them to analysis or scrutiny,” nor was the court required to interpret “church doctrine or any regulation of
the ecclesiastical activity”); see also supra text accompanying notes 238-41, 246-49.
282. See generally Apostolic New Life Church of Elgin v. Dominquez, 686 N.E.2d
1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997).
283. See id. at 1191, 1195; see also supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
284. See id. at 1195-96 (applying neutral principles was appropriate since the only
issues presented concerned the reunification with a former church and the transfer of property).
285. See generally Duncan v. Peterson, 947 N.E.2d 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010).

2015]

WRESTLING WITH THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

175

is relevant to Puskar aside from the interchurch issue, because Duncan distinguished its subject matter from Bruss.286 When questions of reunification
no longer cloud Puskar’s subject matter, Duncan would be equally distinguishable from Puskar, since the appointment and authority of clergy are
inherently ecclesiastical.287
Ervin applied neutral principles, yet the Ervin court only needed to
look at the non-religious bylaws to determine whether they had been procedurally adhered to when the church dismissed the pastor.288 Although Puskar could at first seem similar to Ervin’s approach because merely looking
at the Regulations to determine whether Bishop Longin had been properly
appointed or dismissed does not appear to involve religious intricacies, the
Regulations and respective constitutions are religiously incorporated, and
the Second District does not observe Ervin’s procedural adherence rule.
The Regulations incorporated the constitutions of both the Metropolitanate
Diocese and the Serbian Church, which in themselves incorporated religious aspects, and the Regulations also referred to the Serbian Church’s
“Holy Scripture and Holy Tradition.”289 And since Bruss, the Second District by extension disfavors the Ervin rule of law that procedural compliance could allow jurisdiction over what may have been otherwise precluded
ecclesiastical subject matter.290 The only actual similarity to Ervin is the
fact that Ervin would have applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine had
it needed to decide whether the pastor violated church rules, which is like
delving into Bishop Longin’s authority and whether he had adhered to
church rules, i.e., the Regulations or respective constitutions.291
Finally, the neutral approach to a contract dispute over severance pay
in Jenkins cannot be applied to Puskar. In Jenkins, the church bylaws specifically addressed the circumstances that such a contract claim may have
arisen,292 but Puskar did not have a clear-cut provision unambiguously
permitting civil court jurisdiction over either religious or non-religious issues. Further distinguishable is how Puskar involves ecclesiastical issues
whereas Jenkins did not.293
286. Id. at 312-13 (stating Bruss required a court to focus on the subject matter of the
dispute, and the subject matter in Bruss concerned the qualifications of a priest, compared to
the subject matter in Duncan which concerned a false light invasion of privacy).
287. See Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1119-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008);
see also supra notes 251, 264.
288. See Ervin v. Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 813 N.E.2d 1073,
1077-78 (Ill. App. 1st. Dist. Ct. 2004).
289. See Puskar v. Krco, 2013 IL App (2d) 120847-U, ¶ 7.
290. See Bruss, 895 N.E.2d at 1115 n.8; see also supra note 232.
291. See Ervin, 813 N.E.2d at 1078.
292. See Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1211-13
(Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2005).
293. See id. at 1212-13.
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V. CONCLUSION
Puskar’s holding that the Regulations were no longer in effect is to
state that the Serbian Church and the Metropolitanate Diocese were separate, distinct, and void of religious or hierarchical affiliation. Since the case
was reversed and remanded, such a conclusion leaves the trial court in an
impossible position. Forced to ignore the Regulations, the trial court would
be stuck between adjudicating the authority and responsibilities of Bishop
Longin towards the Metropolitanate Diocese, possibly through deference to
the Metropolitanate Diocese’s former highest authority, the People’s Assembly, even though Bishop Longin was appointed and elected by the Serbian Church in accordance with the religiously incorporated Regulations.
The majority’s position is untenable because the court could have
found the Regulations remained in effect or, moreover, that a meaningful
reunification had transpired.294 A significant amount of evidence was
known or available to the court to undermine its conclusion that the Regulations had expired after three years.295 The remarkable history of the Serbian
Church and the Metropolitanate Diocese could also have been considered.296 And a detailed inquiry into all necessary evidence, even if religiously incorporated documentation were involved, would not defeat eventual
application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.297
Puskar could have, therefore, applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.298 A wide array of Illinois appellate court cases have addressed the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.299 The relevance of each case to Puskar
varies, but the emerging rules of law supply adequate analysis for applying
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to Puskar.300 The hierarchical authority of the Serbian Church would require ecclesiastical deference; and Bishop
Longin’s selection as Diocesan Bishop, his loyalty to the Serbian Church
while serving within the Metropolitanate Diocese, and his authority to file
the amended Affidavit of Organization would all be ecclesiastical issues
such as to require court abstention.301

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See supra text and accompanying notes 133-97.
See supra text and accompanying notes 158-69.
See supra text and accompanying notes 170-82.
See supra text and accompanying notes 183-97.
See supra text and accompanying notes 198- 206.
See supra text and accompanying notes 207-49.
See supra text and accompanying notes 250-93.
See supra text and accompanying notes 198-206, 250-93.

